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ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL SERVICE CHARITIES:
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SOURCES OF FUNDING
Garth Heutel, Harvard University

P

UBLIC GOODS PROVISION IS A TOPIC OF INTEREST

both academically and in a policy arena. Left
solely to private decision makers, a public
good is provided at a less than optimal level. The
clear policy solution is government provision of
the good. However, even in the case of government provision, an individual may still choose to
provide public goods, either due to the extent to
which the benefits from the good are captured by
the individual, or to a “warm glow” received from
contributing. Thus, when policy makers choose
provision levels, they must account for the level of
private provision; otherwise the public good may in
fact be oversupplied relative to the optimal level.
The interaction between public and private
sources of contributions to public goods is of special importance to environmental policy. Numerous
environmental public goods, including clean air
and reserved open space, are provided by both public and private funding. Cap-and-trade policies, in
which the government mandates a fixed maximum
industry-wide level of emissions and allows firms
to trade permits to achieve the goal, exemplify this.
Permits may be purchased by anyone, not merely
potential emitters, and many environmental groups
are actively involved in purchasing and retiring permits to reduce the total amount of pollutants.1 Parkland can be provided publicly, such as with national
or state parks, or through private organizations.
There is currently much emphasis on expanding
public-private partnerships in helping the environment. Massachusetts in 2003 created the Office of
Public Private Partnerships within the Executive
Office of Environmental Affairs to coordinate such
efforts. The Bush Administration has long favored
a voluntary approach to environmental regulation,
where governments and private firms collaborate
on achieving environmental goals.
The issue of private or voluntary provision of
public goods is vital to the policy issue of climate
change. The climate is not merely a public good; it
is a global public good. To the extent that emissions
mitigation must be implemented by nations, it must
be provided voluntary by these nations, given that
no super-national authority can mandate emissions

reductions from individual nations. Designing
appropriate policies and incentives to achieve
optimal provision of this global public good is a
central area of applied research.2
A literature that examines this interaction
between public and private funding of public goods
deals with the specific question of how public funds
crowd out or crowd in private funds. Many papers
use data from nonprofit organizations to address
this issue. Most of these studies focus on a single
type of charity, usually social service charities.
This group of charities includes those that address
problems of hunger, homelessness, housing, crime,
and other social problems. Other papers focus on
arts organizations. No papers address the issue of
crowding in or crowding out by looking specifically
at environmental charities. In this paper, I extend
a chapter of my dissertation and compare results
from a model of the crowding in and crowding
out of public and private contributions to charities, using data from both social service charities
and environmental charities. The results from the
two sets of charities are quite different. The data
from social service charities are consistent with
the model: government grants to charities crowd
in private donations due to a signaling effect, and
private donations crowd out government grants.
For environmental charities, these predicted results
are not found with significance. Because the results
from the two sets of charities, providing different
types of public goods, are so different, they urge
caution in applying the results from a particular
type of charity or public good to a broader class.
In the next section, I briefly summarize the
model I use to make the predictions described
previously, and I introduce some related literature. I
then describe the data used, followed by the results.
I end with a conclusion interpreting the differences
between the two sets of charities.
CROWDING OUT AND CROWDING IN OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE CONTRIBUTIONS

When government contributes to provide public
goods, individuals may offset changes in govern-
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ment contributions, if individuals care only about
the total level of provision of the public good.
The earliest papers on the crowding out of private
donations by government grants, in fact, show that
in this case crowding out is perfectly one-for-one,
so that the total level of provision is unaffected by
the government’s chosen level. This is the result
reached in both Warr (1982) and Roberts (1984).
However, empirical evidence has often found that
where there is crowding out of government grants,
it is less than one-for-one. Kingma (1989) finds
only partial crowding out of donations for public
radio stations. A common explanation for this result
is provided in Andreoni (1989), who suggests
that individuals receive utility both from the total
amount of the public good and the amount that
is donated by that particular individual: a “warm
glow” effect. With this effect, private and public
contributions to the public good are no longer
perfect substitutes, so the one-for-one crowding
out is no longer present.
Though many studies find crowding out of
private donations, some find crowding in: an
increase in government grants to a charity leads
to an increase in private donations to that charity.
This is found in Khanna and Sandler (2000) for
charities in the United Kingdom and Payne (2001)
for academic research institutions. A number of
different explanations for this phenomenon are
provided in Rose-Ackerman (1986). The explanation that I focus on here is one of signaling: the
government grants provide information to potential
donors about the quality of the charity. Signaling in
charitable contributions is also studied by Andreoni
(1998), who develops a model of seed money from
large private donors resolving uncertainty about the
quality of a public good, and in List and LuckingReiley (2002), who conduct a field experiment and
find evidence for the crowding in of seed money.
In Heutel (2007), I make two contributions to
this literature, which I summarize here. Details
are available in that paper. First, while the literature focuses on how government grants affect
private donations, I examine causality in the other
directions. If government grants can crowd out
private donations, can private donations crowd
out government grants? By simply extending
the standard model of crowding out by allowing the government’s level of contribution to be
endogenous, the best response functions for both
individuals and the government do indeed show
that crowding out is possible in either direction.

Second, I add uncertainty to the standard crowding
out model and allow for government grants to act
as a signal of that uncertainty. In this case, government grants can cause crowding in, if a higher
level of grants signals a higher quality of the public
good. As potential donors observe higher levels of
grants to a charity, they update their beliefs about
the quality of that charity and adjust their level of
donations accordingly.
DATA ON SOCIAL SERVICE AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHARITIES

Data were obtained from the National Center on
Charitable Statistics, at the Urban Institute.3 Data
are collected from the IRS Form 990s that must be
submitted by all 501(c)(3) nonprofit organizations
that have at least $25,000 in gross receipts annually, though religious organizations are excepted.
The data are from fiscal years 1998-2003 and they
include 1,388,480 total observations in an unbalanced panel. Organizations are classified according to the National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities
(NTEE), which divides organizations into 26 major
groups. I focus on charities classified into major
groups C and D, representing “Environment” and
“Animal-Related,” respectively. Environmental
charities are defined as those groups whose primary
purpose is to preserve, protect, and improve the
environment. Animal-related charities are defined
as private nonprofit organizations whose primary
purpose is to provide for the care, protection, and
control of wildlife and domestic animals that are
a part of the living environment; to help people
develop an understanding of their pets; and to
train animals for purposes of showing.4 Hereafter,
I refer to all of these charities as environmental
organizations. I compare the results based on data
from environmental organizations to results based
on a set of other types of social service organizations. This set includes organizations that focus
on the following: crime, employment, food and
nutrition, housing, human services, and community
improvement.5 This set of organizations, hereafter
referred to as social service organizations, provides
a basis to see how the environmental organizations differ.
The differences in charities’ revenue sources
can be seen in Figure 1, which divides up the
average source of funding for each type of charity
into several categories.6 The revenue sources for
the two types of charities are dramatically differ251
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Figure 1

Sources of Revenue, Environmental Charities
Other 3%
Rents and Sales 5%
Investment Income 4%
Dues 4%

Direct Public Support
50%

Program Service
Revenue 21%

Government Grants
Indirect Public Support
11%
2%

Sources of Revenue, Social Service Charities
Rents and Sales
2%
Investment Income
2%
Dues
2%

Other
2%

Direct Public Support
14%
Indirect Public Support
3%

Government Grants
26%

Program Service
Revenue
49%

Notes: Environmental charities include those in NTEE codes C (Environment) and D (Animal-related). Social
service charities include those in NTEE codes I (Crime and Legal-related), J (Employment), K (Food, Agriculture,
and Nutrition), L (Housing and Shelter), P (Human Services), and S (Community Improvement and Capacity
Building). Investment income includes interest and dividends; rents and sales includes securities and inventory;
other includes special events’ revenues.
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Notes: Data are averaged over 1998-2003 in constant 2002 dollars. Private donations include direct and indirect public support and dues. Other revenue includes interest,
rents, and sales.
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Government Grants
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269
140
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Number of Organizations
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Table 1
Summary Statistics—Charity Revenues

Standard deviation
($1,000s)

96
0
6
10

Median
($1,000s)

283
17
82
46

75th percentile
($1,000s)

ent. Environmental charities receive half of their
revenue from direct public support, including
individual donations, while social service charities
receive only 14 percent from this source. Government grants constitute a much smaller share of
environmental charities’ revenues (11 percent) than
of social service charities’ revenues (26 percent).
Social service charities get about half of their
revenue from program services; environmental
charities receive only one-fifth of their revenues
from this source. The remaining sources of revenues are small for both types of charities, though
environmental charities receive more in each of
the remaining categories.
Table 1 presents revenues aggregated into four
main categories. As a measure of private donations, I combine direct public support, indirect
public support, and dues. Government grants and
program service revenue have their own categories, and the remaining revenues are classified as
“other.” The top panel of Table 1 lists statistics
for environmental organizations, the bottom panel
for social service organizations. The number of
environmental organizations is about one-fifteenth
the number of social service organizations. On
average, environmental organizations receive less
total revenue than social service organizations
($1,281,000 vs. $1,975,000). Of this revenue,
though, they receive a great deal more from private
donations, and less from government grants and
program service revenue. Finally, the mean values
are all much higher than the median values, and
even the 75th percentile values, suggesting a data
set that is skewed towards high-revenue firms.
These statistics suggest that the revenue sources
for environmental charities are quite different than
those of social service charities.
Trends in these values are presented in Figure
2. The top panel is for environmental charities; the
bottom panel for social service charities. The values
presented are the average per charity value of government grants and private donations in constant
2002 dollars. Just as shown in Table 1 for 2002
only, environmental charities receive more from
private donations than from government grants,
while social service charities receive more from
government grants in all years.
The presence of crowding out in either direction
implies that spikes in government grants would be
accompanied by dips in private donations, and vice
versa. For social service charities, no such pattern
emerges, since both values appear to be increas-
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Figure 2
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Notes: Environmental and Social Service charities are defined as in Figure 1. All dollar values are deflated by CPI.
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ing. However, environmental charities exhibit this
pattern. After 2001, a dip in private donations is
accompanied by an increase in government grants.7
This is merely suggestive, so I turn to regression
analysis to identify the presence of a crowding
out effect.
RESULTS

I test for crowding out or crowding in of either
government grants or private donations. This
entails two regression equations; one where government grants is the dependent variable and one
where private donations is the dependent variable.
Analysis is done at the charity-year level in a fixedeffects framework. A number of control variables
are included in both regressions. At the charity
level, I include the amounts of program service
revenue and all other revenue. At the county-year
level, I include the unemployment rate, average
household income, and total population, while at
the state-year level I include the fraction of the
population 65 or older, the fraction of a state’s
U.S. Congress and Senate delegations that are
Democrats, and a dummy for whether the state
governor is a Democrat.
A set of instruments is required for the level of
government grants and another one for the level of
private donations. I look to the literature for instruments for the level of government grants, since this
direction of causality has been examined before.
The instruments I use are state-year level measures
of government transfers to individuals from Supplemental Security Income (SSI) programs.8 This
is a measure of the “generosity” of the government
in a particular year, or the availability of funds for
charitable activity. An additional instrument is the
average level of government grants to charities in
a state-year.
I use two instruments at the state-year level for
private donations. First is the price of a dollar of
a charitable donation based on state and federal
income tax rates and rules for allowing deductions of charitable contributions. This information is available from NBER’s Taxsim program.9
Although a large literature finds that tax incentives
do have significant impacts on individual-level
charitable contributions, in this case this instrument has very low predictive power. This is
because the tax rate used is a statewide average,
and significant heterogeneity in marginal tax rates
and itemization exists within states. Furthermore,

a charity may receive donations from individuals
located in other states, so the tax incentives in the
charity’s home state do not necessarily apply to
that charity’s donors.
In addition to this weak instrument, I add a stateyear level measure of disposable income, generated
from the ratio of state-level average home prices,
as measured by the Freddie Mac Conventional
Mortgage Home Price Index, to the county-level
per capita income. This ratio represents the fraction of the average consumer’s income devoted
to a large nondiscretionary expense and therefore
unavailable for discretionary spending including
charitable contributions.
Regression results appear in Table 2. The first
two columns are from social service charities
(replicating the results from Heutel (2007)), and the
last two columns are from environmental charities.
In columns one and three, the dependent variable
is private donations and the endogenous regressor
is government grants; in columns two and four
those are reversed. The results from social service
charities are consistent with the theories described
previously. There is evidence that government
grants crowd in private donations, as would be
expected if government grants are signaling charity
quality. The level of crowding in is about 60 cents
per dollar. There is also evidence of government
grants responding to private donations; in this
direction the effect is one of crowding out. The
magnitude of the crowding out effect in this direction is very large: greater than one-for-one. This
may be due to endogeneity bias from instrument
choice; Heutel (2007) shows that this result is not
very robust to other specifications and alternative
instrument choices. In columns three and four, the
results for environmental charities are quite different. The sign of each coefficient is opposite that of
its corresponding coefficient in the social service
charities’ regressions, but neither is significantly
different from zero.
As described in Heutel (2007), though omitted here, the results from column one showing
government grants crowding in private donations
for social service charities are robust to a number
of specifications, including regressing on lagged
values of government grants, estimating simultaneously with 3SLS, weak instrument tests, and
estimating by LIML instead of least squares. In
none of these robustness checks is a significant
coefficient found on the variables of interest in the
equations for environmental charities.
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Table 2
Regression Results
Social Service Charities

Environmental Charities

(4)
(1)
(2)
(3)
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
= Private Donations = Government Grants = Private Donations = Government Grants
Endogenous Regressor
(Government Grants or
Private Donations)

.582**
(.226)

-2.43*
(1.16)

-.0744
(.199)

.135
(.503)

Program Service Revenue

.131*
(.0614)

-.323**
(.0413)

.120
(.0893)

-.0965
(.0554)

Other Revenue

-.0160
(.0146)

-.0794
(.0457)

-.0226
(.0427)

-.0215
(.0209)

Population

.00330
(.00442)

.0169
(.0115)

.00115
(.00357)

.00429
(.00275)

Income

-1.48
(1.03)

-2.17
(1.98)

1.93
(6.11)

-10.6*
(4.70)

Unemployment Rate,
Percent

1480
(1770)

-1270
(3710)

-8910
(11900)

-18300*
(8610)

Percent Population > 65

-17000**
(6110)

-42900*
(20900)

-35500*
(15900)

18200
(20000)

Number Dem Senators

2710
(4540)

8820
(9900)

-26200
(16700)

3250
(15200)

Percent Congress
members Dem

4550
(21000)

62800
(47900)

1170
(70500)

-18000
(46300)

Indicator for Democratic
governor

-8140
(5980)

3770
(11100)

16000
(19500)

-2460
(12500)

F-test on significance of
instruments in first stage
regression (p-value)

6.58
(.000)

2.66
(.0700)

1.77
(.1512)

0.31
(.576)

Overidentification Sargan
test statistic (p-value)

4.83
(.0893)

0.000
(.9861)

0.630
(.730)

.895
(.344)

Number of Observations
Number of Charities

175234
29206

175234
29206

16602
2767

16602
2767

Notes: Data are from 1998-2003 and only include those organizations that are in the panel for all six years and whose
reported categorical revenues sum up to reported total revenues, and likewise for expenses. Instruments for government
grants are the state-year average value of grants to charities, the state-year total payments paid to individuals through
SSI, and the state-year payments paid to individuals through SSI for the aged. Instruments for private donations are the
calculated private cost of donations, based upon the state plus federal income tax rate and whether states allow charitable
deductions, and the ratio of a state’s home price index to a county’s per capita income.
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As an additional test for environmental charities, I select a particular category of charity and
use instruments specific to that category to attempt
to better identify the effect of private donations
on government grants. The first instrument is the
number of species listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),
in a state-year. Listing a species is an early step in
the process under the ESA. By listing a species,
it becomes illegal to hunt or otherwise harm that
species, but no governmental action is taken until
possibly a critical habitat for the species is chosen.
As of 1998, only 40 percent of listed species had
designated critical habitat. Therefore, listing a species is expected to have no direct effect on government grants to charities that deal with endangered
species. However, having a new species listed
nearby is likely to promote individuals to donate to
charities that deal with that issue. Since the ESA is
widely reported in the media, individuals are likely
to be aware of the new listings.10 The instruments
used are a count of the number of species listed
as either endangered or threatened in each state
in each year.
The NTEE classification system category “D31”
covers charities that deal with “Protection of
Endangered Species.” Because only a few of these
charities (14) appear in the data set in all six years,
I also include charities from category “D30”: Wildlife Preservation and Protection. These charities
are also likely to be impacted by announcements
of the listing of endangered species. The results
from these regressions, not presented here, are
again insignificant. Though the new instrument is
expected to identify the effect of private donations
on government grants, none of the coefficients on
that variable are significant. This may partly be
due to the fact that so few charities fall into this
category, especially in the columns that exclude
the broader “D30” designation.
I next use a different instrument for private donations that applies to a different set of charities. The
Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) is an EPA-sponsored program that publicly releases information
on toxic chemicals emitted by individual plants.
Businesses and government agencies self-report
emissions, which are available on the EPA Web site.
The reported level of emissions does not relate to
any regulatory power; they are reported simply to
inform the public and allow individuals to make
more informed decisions about how pollution
impacts their health. Because of this, reported TRI

emissions are likely to impact private donations to
charities that deal with industrial pollution but are
unlikely to affect government behavior directly.
The NTEE category “C20” covers charities dedicated to “Pollution Abatement and Control.” The
regression results from this set of charities using
this instrument also fails to find any evidence of
the hypothesized effect of private donations on
government grants.
DISCUSSION

This paper uses data from various types of public
goods, but the results are important to environmental
issues in particular. Both the regressions and the
summary statistics show that, compared to social
service charities, environmental charities behave
in significantly different ways when it comes to
finances. They get a lower fraction of their funding from government grants and a higher fraction
of their funding from private donations. While the
evidence presented here shows a significant relationship between government and private funding of
social service charities, no such relationship is found
for environmental charities. Since environmental
charities behave so much differently than other types
of charities, it is errant to extrapolate results found
from other charities to environmental charities.
The results for environmental charities are insignificant. Though there are fewer observations from
environmental charities than from social service
charities, there are still tens of thousands, so small
sample size is not likely to be a problem.11 The data
from environmental organizations may contain
more measurement error, especially as these charities tend to be smaller in terms of total revenues
and younger. For both reasons, these charities may
be less knowledgeable about the reporting requirements for the IRS forms. Another reason for the
insignificant results for environmental charities
may be that by looking only at data from charities,
I am unable to capture any other types of crowding
out behavior that may be unrelated to the charities.
For example, in response to an increase in government grants to environmental charities, individuals
may not alter their contributions to charities, but
instead alter their level of volunteering or recycling.12 Similarly, governments may respond to an
increase in private donations by decreasing funding
to the EPA or other environmental activities besides
the particular charity affected. This would bias
downward my estimates of crowding out.
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According to White House audits, the total
amount of federal grants to environmental charities in 2004 was $143 million, whereas the 2005
EPA budget totaled $7.8 billion. Much of the EPA’s
spending went to grants paid to states and tribal
governments, which may in turn have used that
federal money to pay grants to environmental charities. But it is clear that at least some and perhaps a
large fraction of the money that government uses to
provide environmental public goods are provided
in other ways besides grants to charities. How this
effect may bias the results is unclear. If grants to
charities are a constant fraction of government
spending on public goods, then no bias exists,
since the increase that I see in the data in government grants to charities corresponds to an increase
in actual government provision of public goods.
However, if the government substitutes nonprofit
grants for other spending on public goods (so that
when I see an increase in grants in the data, the
actual government provision of public goods may
have stayed constant or decreased), then the results
may be biased. If this effect is more pronounced for
environmental public goods, this may explain the
lack of significant results for those charities.

5
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Notes
1

2

3
4

A list of such organizations is available at http://www.
epa.gov/airmarkt/trading/buying.html#groups.
Aldy and Stavins (2007) discuss a number of policy options for international frameworks addressing climate
change beyond the Kyoto period.
http://nccs.urban.org.
Specifically, environmental charities include those
involved in pollution control and abatement; conservation and development of natural resources; control or
elimination of hazardous or toxic substances including
pesticides; solid waste management; urban beautification and open spaces development; environmental
education and outdoor survival; and botanical gardens
and horticultural societies. Animal-related charities
include organizations that develop and maintain fish-

8

9
10
11

12
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eries resources and wildlife habitats to preserve and
protect endangered species and other wildlife; humane
societies; veterinary services; aquariums; and zoos.
These are the organizations listed under the 1-digit
NTEE codes of I, J, K, L, P, and S. This is the same set
of codes used by Andreoni and Payne (2003) for their
set of social service organizations. Here, I separate
environmental charities from the rest of the group.
Andreoni and Payne (2003) also exclude some organizations that they describe as not directly providing
services, while I include all 501(c)(3) organizations in
those categories (see their fn. 15).
The first category is direct public support, which is the
main category of donations from individuals. Second is
indirect public support, comprised mainly of donations
given to the charities collected by federated fundraising
agencies, such as the United Way. The next category
is government grants, which includes monies from
federal, state, and local governments. Program service revenue is the money collected from the services
that form the organizations exemption from tax. For
example, a hospital would count as program service
revenue all of its charges from medical services or
room charges. Dues collected includes only the amount
of dues received that are not contributions, for example
the dues that go towards a subscription to a newsletter
or some other benefit. Investment income includes
dividends and interest on savings and cash accounts;
rents and sales include net revenue from rents and
from sales of securities, inventory, or other assets.
Finally, the last category includes all other revenue,
including from special events such as dinners, raffles,
or door-to-door sales of merchandise. Revenues are
disaggregated into these categories only for charities
which file Form 990, not Form 990-EZ. Eighty-seven
percent of social service charities do so, as do 75
percent of environmental charities. Nonprofits with
income less than $100,000 and total assets less than
$250,000 can file Form 990-EZ, though they may file
Form 990 if they prefer.
The dip in private donations to environmental charities
approximately coincides with the recession in the early
2000s. The fact that a similar dip is not visible in private
donations to social service charities may indicate that
donations to environmental charities are more income
elastic than donations to social service charities.
Khanna and Sandler (2000), Andreoni and Payne
(2003), and Payne (1998) use similar instruments.
See www.nber.org/~taxsim.
Hendrickson (2005).
Also, when disaggregating categories of charities,
several categories of social service charities which
contain fewer observations than the environmental
charity data set still provide significant consistent
regression results.
Simmons and Emanuele (2004) find that government
grants crowd out donations of both money and time.
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